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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA (MONUA)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1149 (1998) of 27 January 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to submit a comprehensive report, which would also incorporate the update requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 1135 (1997) of 29 October 1997, on the implementation of the timetable approved by the Joint Commission on 9 January 1998 (see S/1998/56, annex). The present report also contains recommendations regarding the reconfiguration of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) before 30 April 1998, as well as preliminary recommendations regarding the United Nations presence in Angola after 30 April 1998.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. During the period under review, in the absence of my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, who resumed his duties in Luanda on 11 March 1998, the Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Behrooz Sadry, conducted, in close collaboration with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), intensive consultations with both the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) with a view to accelerating the completion of the remaining tasks under the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex). However, the failure by UNITA to comply by the end of February with the 9 January 1998 timetable generated tension between the parties on the ground and demanded renewed efforts by the United Nations and the observer States to put the peace process back on track.

3. On 2 March, my Deputy Special Representative and the representatives of the observer States were received by President José Eduardo dos Santos. During the discussion, the President of Angola stressed that UNITA was responsible for major delays in the completion of the demobilization process and extension of State administration. The President strongly believed that more pressure should be exerted on UNITA to ensure that it complies with all of its obligations. While deploring the abuses of power by some elements of the Angolan National

Police (ANP), the President underscored the difficult conditions and hostility they were facing in the former UNITA-held areas.

4. On the same day, Mr. Sadry, accompanied by the representatives of the observer States, met with Mr. Savimbi to impress on him the need for UNITA to take urgent and concrete measures to fulfil its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions. In an earlier meeting with Mr. Sadry, on 3 February, Mr. Savimbi had reiterated his commitment to the peace process, but stated that the Government of Angola was harassing, displacing and even killing UNITA representatives and sympathizers in the countryside. He believed this was an attempt to destroy his party. Mr. Savimbi reaffirmed, in principle, his willingness to meet President dos Santos, but expressed serious concern over his security if the meeting were to be held in Luanda. However, at the 2 March meeting, Mr. Savimbi reversed his position and indicated that a meeting with the President and his move to Luanda were now unlikely, owing to the increased attacks against him by the media and the Government. The representatives of the observer States warned Mr. Savimbi that UNITA might face additional measures by the international community if it continued to renege on its responsibilities for the implementation of the 9 January timetable.

5. These efforts yielded results on 6 March 1998, when UNITA finally issued a declaration on the complete demilitarization of its forces. The declaration was based on a compromise between the Government and UNITA, according to which special arrangements would be made to demobilize the remaining registered UNITA troops by mid-March 1998. The declaration should also serve as an important catalyst for the completion of other pending tasks under the Lusaka Protocol, including the legalization of UNITA as a political party and the promulgation into law of the special status of its leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi. On 10 March, MONUA issued a declaration concerning the demilitarization of UNITA, that cleared the way for the legalization of UNITA as political party. This was announced by the Government on 11 March, in accordance with the revised timetable.

6. The Joint Commission also endorsed on 6 March UNITA's declaration and approved a 12-point revised timetable that envisages the implementation of all remaining tasks by 31 March 1998. According to this timetable, the Government was expected to resume the disarming of the civilian population on 6 March. The Government would also declare the legalization of UNITA as a political party and promulgate by 11 March a law granting special status to Mr. Savimbi. On 16 March, all governors, vice-governors and ambassadors nominated by UNITA would be appointed by the Government, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. The normalization of State administration would be concluded by 1 April, with the transfer to central authority of all politically sensitive areas controlled by UNITA, including Andulo and Bailundo.

7. In addition, an agreement was reached on the personal security detachment for Mr. Savimbi, according to which its projected strength of 400 personnel would be reduced gradually to 150 over a period of nine months. These 150 personnel will be deployed in Luanda and other locations where Mr. Savimbi will maintain residences. However, discussions continue on the exact strength of the Luanda detachment; the Government insists on a maximum of 50 security guards, whereas UNITA wishes to have more flexibility concerning this figure.

Discussions also continue on the allocation of office space and accommodation to the UNITA leadership in Luanda.

8. It should be recalled that the 9 January 1998 agreement on the "final" timetable for the implementation of the major tasks under the Lusaka Protocol by 28 February 1998, had raised hopes that the key aspects of the peace process would be concluded in early 1998. Regrettably, by the end of February, only the demobilization of UNITA "residual" troops had been formally declared concluded by the Joint Commission, thus leaving unaccomplished several important aspects of the Lusaka Protocol.

9. Since my last report to the Security Council on Angola dated 12 January 1998 (S/1998/17), some progress has been achieved in the normalization of State administration. To date, State administration authority has been extended to 264 out of a total of 335 localities envisaged in the process. The delay in the normalization of State administration in the UNITA strongholds of Andulo, Bailundo and Mussende, which is due mostly to political considerations, also hinders the establishment of central authority in adjacent areas, where UNITA appears to be maintaining a security perimeter. However, UNITA claims that the delays in the normalization of these areas are mostly due to the conduct of the ANP, which is being accused of gross violations of human rights. At the same time, in some provinces, delays are related to logistical difficulties and security considerations on the part of the Government.

10. During the reporting period, several serious incidents occurred, which disrupted the extension of central authority in Moxico and Malange provinces. The normalization process in Lumbala N'guimbo (Moxico Province) faced a major setback when, on 14 February, UNITA militants raided the ANP post and confiscated their weapons and other equipment. A few days later, in the same province, UNITA elements disarmed police officers deployed at Cazombo, where State administration was established on 24 January. On 17 February, UNITA militants damaged the airfield and two bridges at Cambundi Catembo (Malange Province) before the normalization of State administration in that area. On the following day, also in Malange Province, the normalization process was suspended in Luquembo when a MONUA helicopter transporting United Nations, Government and UNITA representatives to a ceremony for the installation of new administrators was fired upon. On 26 February, the Joint Commission undertook a mission to Cazombo in order to assess the situation on the ground and assist in defusing the tensions. The Joint Commission, while noting the unjustifiably high number of heavy weapons brought to the area by ANP personnel, condemned the incident in Cazombo and urged the UNITA leadership to exert control over its members in order to prevent the recurrence of such hostile acts in the future. Needless to say, harassment and attacks on United Nations personnel by UNITA deserve strong condemnation and should not be tolerated.

11. In a development related to the measures imposed on UNITA by the Security Council in its resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August 1997, a DC-4 aircraft flying from South Africa to the UNITA stronghold of Andulo was intercepted in Angolan airspace by the Angolan Air Force and was forced to land in Menongue (Cuando Cubango Province) on 20 January. MONUA was not allowed to inspect the aircraft, which, according to the Government of Angola, was carrying supplies for UNITA in contravention of the sanctions regime. On 3 February, another aircraft was

impounded at Luanda airport because it was registered as a plane servicing UNITA-held areas. To the extent possible, MONUA continued to monitor flights into UNITA-controlled areas. According to United Nations observers on the ground, during the month of January, some 40 flights landed at a number of locations controlled by UNITA, compared to 187 flights recorded in December 1997.

12. With regard to the transformation of UNITA's Radio Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility to be called "Radio Despertar", the 6 March 1998 revised timetable includes an agreement between the Government and UNITA stipulating that Radio Vorgan would cease broadcasting on 31 March 1998. In the meantime, efforts have continued to allow Radio Despertar to become operational as soon as possible by acquiring the necessary equipment. At the 6 March meeting of the Joint Commission, the UNITA delegation promised that, during the interim period, the tone of its radio broadcasts would be moderated.

13. In this respect, as indicated in my last report to the Security Council (S/1998/17), MONUA has been paying particular attention to its public relations efforts aimed at strengthening peace-building and national reconciliation. To this end, United Nations public information officers have been deployed to several politically sensitive areas. The improved outreach will help broaden local political dialogue and public participation in the peace process, as envisioned in the mandate of MONUA.

14. Since the coming into force of the new measures against UNITA on 30 October 1997, 37 Member States have replied to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) on the steps they have taken to implement the sanctions against UNITA. On 19 February 1998, the Committee issued an updated list of UNITA senior officials and adult members of their families who are affected by the sanctions. On 4 March, the President of the Sanctions Committee, Mr. Njuguna M. Mahugu (Kenya), announced his intention to visit Angola and neighbouring countries in order to review the implementation of the sanctions and impress on the parties the need to proceed with the peace process.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

15. Although in February 1998 tensions between the Government and UNITA increased in some areas of the country, the general military situation in Angola has remained relatively stable. Some of the tensions were due to the aggressive conduct of the ANP, which often harasses the local population in the areas where central authority has been recently established. At the same time, the security situation has deteriorated in some parts of Angola as a result of politically motivated attacks instigated by both UNITA "residual" troops and supporters, and Government forces. Overall security has also been affected by the discovery of numerous arms caches and the laying of new mines in Bié Province, which is attributed to UNITA elements.

16. The registration and disarmament of "residual" UNITA troops was announced as completed on 22 December 1997. A total of 7,877 soldiers had been registered after handing over 7,275 weapons, including heavy weapons and ammunition of

various calibres amounting to 57,592,530 rounds. The in situ demobilization of those troops was concluded on 26 February, with the demobilization of 5,857 UNITA troops.

17. As indicated in my report of 12 January 1998, the planned downsizing of the military contingent of MONUA has been accomplished. In accordance with resolution 1149 (1998), the present strength of the MONUA military task force stands at 1,045 personnel, including 4 infantry companies, 45 staff officers and 90 military observers, along with the small helicopter, signals, logistics and medical support units. With the present military force, the United Nations retains a capacity to respond to emergency security needs and continues to assist in the implementation of residual military tasks.

IV. POLICE ASPECTS

18. In view of the substantial withdrawal of MONUA military units and the progress made in the normalization of State administration, the tasks of the civilian police component have increased in terms of both geographical coverage and its impact on the peace process. The presence of civilian police observers in many sensitive localities throughout the country enables MONUA to monitor the conduct of the ANP in order to prevent human rights abuses and to instil much-needed confidence in the civilian population. In addition, United Nations police observers continue to monitor the activities of the rapid reaction police, the effective incorporation of UNITA elements into the ANP and the rapid reaction police and the security arrangements for UNITA leadership, as well as to perform other crucial tasks. These tasks include the investigation of alleged human rights violations and visits to prisons.

19. With the rise in armed banditry, civilian police are increasingly involved in the monitoring of the collection of weapons from the civilian population, which is a high-priority task for the Government. This task includes the disarmament of the civil defence corps, whose existence has been confirmed in many parts of the country. The ANP plan of action for the disarming of civilians in the areas where State administration has recently been established includes three phases, namely, a public awareness campaign, the voluntary hand-over of weapons and enforced collection of unauthorized weapons. This plan, however, has been seriously criticized because its implementation has been limited to the areas formerly controlled by UNITA, where the disarming operations have often been conducted with excessive use of force and without due regard to fundamental freedoms.

20. The United Nations civilian police component has proposed the development of an assistance programme for the training of the ANP and the rapid reaction police in the use of internationally accepted human rights standards and police procedures to facilitate the process of national reconciliation. It is ready to discuss the practical modalities of such a programme with the Government.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

21. The Human Rights Division of MONUA, in collaboration with the Angolan authorities, has intensified its public awareness efforts, especially in Cuando Cubango, Uige and Benguela provinces, where documents prepared by MONUA on the basic principles and standards of human rights have been distributed to law enforcement officials. Active preparations are also under way for the second national seminar and a series of provincial seminars to promote human rights issues. Training workshops on human rights standards will be held for the Government officials involved in law enforcement, including magistrates and administrators of detention facilities.

22. The ad hoc group of the Joint Commission on allegations of human rights violations continued to review reports of human rights abuses and to recommend appropriate action. Most of these alleged abuses, including unlawful detention, torture and killing of innocent civilians, have been committed by the ANP in newly normalized areas. The recommendations of the group were submitted to the Joint Commission for follow-up action by the Government and UNITA. However, the implementation of many of these recommendations has been less than encouraging. This is particularly regrettable considering the need to bring officials to justice in cases of confirmed human rights abuses, including the death of 10 UNITA supporters detained in Malange. Another important task of the Human Rights Division relates to the strengthening and modernization of the Angolan judicial system, which is vital in promoting respect for human rights and building confidence in the legal process.

VI. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

A. Relief and rehabilitation

23. As a result of prevalent insecurity in some areas, large segments of the local population continued to be displaced. Recently, another 1,200 to 3,000 displaced persons were awaiting permission from the Government and UNITA to return to their villages of origin in Luanda Norte Province. At the same time, humanitarian activities are still suspended or impeded in several localities owing to tensions related to the normalization of State administration.

24. On 13 February, on behalf of the United Nations system, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Ms. Carol Bellamy, launched in Luanda the 1998 consolidated inter-agency appeal for Angola, requesting a total of US$ 91,200,142. The target beneficiaries include 900,000 internally displaced persons, 160,000 Angolan refugees expected to return to the country this year and other war-affected and vulnerable groups. The 1998 appeal underscores the phased and smooth divestment of coordination functions of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs as a result of the expected gradual consolidation of peace and the continued efforts of the Government to assume leadership in the humanitarian sphere. The strategy endorsed by this appeal gives priority to the provision of humanitarian assistance in support of return and resettlement, health and nutrition, agriculture and food security, mine awareness and reintegration of demobilized war-disabled and underage soldiers. The appeal

also calls for the continued support of the international community to strengthen the capacity of the Government of Angola to coordinate and manage the humanitarian response.

25. As the long-term security situation in Angola gradually improves and the need for short-term relief interventions diminishes, the United Nations system is focusing increasingly on ensuring a smooth transition from a complex humanitarian assistance situation to rehabilitation and development. A strategy has been adopted for this purpose under the guidance of the Resident Coordinator, laying out the principles, modalities and required actions. All United Nations agencies and funds will jointly participate in the implementation of this strategy in 1998, thus increasing the impact of their programmes.

26. Following consultations between the Government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, as well as other key donors, agreement was reached in January 1998 concerning the divestiture of demobilization and reintegration activities to UNDP. In view of the proposed phase-out of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit by the end of June 1998, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in consultation with Inter-Agency Standing Committee members, is reviewing humanitarian coordination arrangements for 1998. In their review, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee are taking into consideration both the capacity of the Government and UNDP to assume the humanitarian coordination function and the humanitarian situation in the country. Notwithstanding these consultations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs will maintain a field presence in support of the Humanitarian Coordinator. In this context, UNDP has initiated a project that will strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration to coordinate humanitarian and reintegration activities.

B. Demobilization and social reintegration

27. As at 3 March 1998, 48,027 out of a total of 87,070 registered soldiers had been demobilized. However, the number of absentees (27,291) from the demobilization centres and "residual" troops eligible for demobilization through special arrangements remains a cause of major concern.

28. While the rapid demobilization programme was completed in January 1998 with the closure of the centre for military war-disabled at Mavinga, the demobilization of several special categories of ex-combatants will not be completed before the end of March 1998. However, the Government has pledged that the necessary funds and documents will be available to complete the exercise, as currently planned. At the same time, the Government has yet to indicate the number of excess troops of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the time frame for their demobilization. Some 6,000 FAA war-disabled are being deprived of access to social reintegration programmes, and it is urgent that preparations be initiated for the demobilization of this vulnerable group.

29. Since its inception in August 1996, the Government programme for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers, supported by the Government of Angola, UNDP and other international donors, has offered in all provinces various

services to the demobilized soldiers. These include counselling and referral services, access to quick impact projects and to vocational training, and support for the creation of small businesses. By the end of January 1998, a total of 20,800 demobilized soldiers had been registered by the Counselling and Referral Service (SeCoR). The social reintegration programme has trained special social workers in order to reach ex-soldiers in the most remote areas of the country.

30. Progress has been achieved in the implementation of the social reintegration programme, despite various difficulties encountered since its inception. These difficulties have been caused by delays in the provision of Government subsidies, claims by unregistered soldiers and changes made by most ex-soldiers in their final destinations. Moreover, SeCoR and vocational training programmes funded by the international community face a budgetary shortfall amounting to $10 million. In March 1998, a joint Government/UNDP review of the community rehabilitation and reintegration programme will evaluate its effectiveness in order to make the necessary adjustments.

C. Demining

31. Estimates of the mine pollution in Angola range from 6 to 8 million mine devices planted in over 2,500 minefields, the threat of which has contributed to the displacement of up to one third of the Angolan population and impeded the return of internally displaced persons to their places of origin. As a result, national demining activities have been focused on areas with high population density and those areas which offer particular economic and resettlement potential.

32. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) and MONUA demining programmes and the current programme conducted by UNDP, which supports the National Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE), have trained some 50 senior and middle-level managers working at INAROE headquarters and regional offices. More than 500 deminers, mine mappers, surveyors, radio operators and explosive ordnance disposal technicians have also been trained and are fully operational. By the end of 1997, surveys providing information on the general location of mined areas had been completed in 10 of Angola's 18 provinces, where approximately 80 per cent of the Angolan population live; and more than 1,900 mined areas had been identified. However, the INAROE demining brigades have encountered difficulties because of the lack of cooperation from UNITA, and in some cases from the Government, in providing information on minefields. The overall achievements in mine marking and clearance have also been limited owing to the severity of the problem and the shortage of funds and trained personnel.

VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

33. The Angolan economy is still affected by distortions, which were particularly aggravated during the last quarter of 1997, as a result of an increase in the Government's expenditures. This is mostly due to expenses related to the extension of State administration and the payment of salaries and

bonuses to civil servants. The state budget ran into serious deficits, which in turn led to a sharp rise in inflation and a rapid depreciation in the parallel market rate of the national currency. Prices of goods and services have remained generally high, although the Government was able to halt the hyper-inflation that has characterized the economy in the past five years. Unemployment, however, which is currently estimated at 45 per cent, has remained very high, and the urban labour force works increasingly in the informal sector, while 67 per cent of the population live below the poverty line.

34. The Government budget for 1998 and the Government's medium-term programme for economic recovery and stabilization were actively discussed in the National Assembly in February 1998. Budget estimates for the social sector reflected some improvements in public expenditure patterns. Health and education sectors were allocated 8 per cent and 11.7 per cent respectively, a positive trend in meeting social needs and fighting poverty, which remain at the core of the Government's economic programme for the period 1998-2000.

VIII. RECONFIGURATION OF MONUA COMPONENTS BEFORE 30 APRIL 1998

35. In its resolution 1149 (1998), the Security Council requested me to make recommendations regarding the configuration of MONUA before 30 April 1998, when the current mandate of the Mission will expire. In view of the delays in the implementation of key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and the short period of time remaining until the expiration of the mandate of MONUA, no major changes in the strength and operations of MONUA appear desirable at this time. Nevertheless, it is my intention, subject to conditions on the ground, to resume the gradual downsizing of the military component of the Mission by the end of April. At the same time, the Demobilization and Reintegration Office of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, which was to be funded through the assessed budget until the end of March, will now operate until the end of April, as a result of a recent compromise between the Government and UNITA regarding the special demobilization arrangements for the remaining registered troops.

IX. PROPOSED UNITED NATIONS MANDATE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AFTER 30 APRIL 1998

36. As indicated above, despite some progress made in the implementation of the Lusaka agreements, the current political climate in Angola is still characterized by mistrust between the Government and UNITA, and by a sense of insecurity in the Angolan population. While much has been achieved to bring relative stability to the country over the past three years, the peace process continues to demand concerted international efforts to ensure a lasting peace and the reconstruction of the country. Under these circumstances, it would be advisable to maintain a significant United Nations involvement in the peace process in order to promote confidence-building measures, national reconciliation and socio-economic development. To this end, support from the United Nations would be based on close coordination between the good offices of MONUA and the assistance provided by the United Nations system. At the same time, where appropriate, MONUA would begin gradually to transfer some of its responsibilities to United Nations programmes, funds and agencies.

37. It will be recalled that, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol, the United Nations is expected to determine whether requisite conditions for the holding of the second round of the presidential elections have been met, and to provide appropriate support for the verification and monitoring of the electoral process. While in November 1996 the Angolan National Assembly decided to hold the next legislative elections within two to four years, it is not yet clear when exactly the second round of presidential elections will be conducted. At the same time, during his meeting on 2 March 1998 with my Deputy Special Representative, President dos Santos expressed the view that MONUA should continue to be reduced gradually to a structure sufficient for the verification of the next elections and that it should be phased out thereafter. These views have been taken into account in the proposed mandate and concept of operations outlined below.

A. Political, human rights and public awareness aspects

38. Subject to approval by the Security Council, it is envisaged that MONUA will continue, with the necessary adjustments, to carry out its activities on the basis of the mandate and organizational structure contained in my reports of 7 February (S/1997/115) and 5 June 1997 (S/1997/438) to the Security Council, and approved by the Council in its resolutions 1118 (1997) of 30 June 1997 and 1149 (1998).

39. Accordingly, my Special Representative would continue to provide good offices to the Government and UNITA and to chair the Joint Commission. In addition, political affairs and human rights officers would be deployed to the countryside to mediate disputes and promote national reconciliation and respect for human rights. The MONUA information and public awareness programme would continue to provide an important support function by disseminating impartial information about the peace process, human rights and good governance. The political and human rights components and the Public Information Unit would, for the time being, maintain their current strength and composition.

B. Civilian police component

40. In the light of the progress made in the normalization of State administration and the deployment of ANP personnel into newly normalized areas, a substantial revision of the deployment of civilian police is needed. In this context, it is envisaged that the total number of United Nations civilian police locations would be increased from 46 to 51 and additional team sites in Malange, Uigé, Cuanza Sul and Moxico provinces would be opened. The establishment of these new team sites would help monitor the areas where normalization of State administration has recently taken place and which have a strategic significance for the parties. The revised deployment plan would also allow United Nations civilian police observers to have access to most of the municipalities of the country. In line with the proposal contained in my report of 12 January 1998 (S/1998/17), the Security Council may wish to consider the deployment of up to 83 additional civilian police observers. The current authorized strength of the civilian police component stands at 345 officers. This would also enable MONUA to strengthen selected team sites in order to increase the number of daily

patrols and to ensure the timeliness and effectiveness of United Nations verification and investigation. However, the modus operandi of the civilian police component would be kept under constant review, in order to determine whether these tasks can be performed on the basis of a more limited increase in the number of personnel. At the same time, the composition of the component, which should play a pivotal role in the consolidation of peace in the country, would be enhanced with an increase in the number of Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking officers.

C. Military component

41. Depending on the situation on the ground and the progress made in the implementation of residual military tasks, the gradual reduction of the military component of the Mission would resume by the end of April 1998. The withdrawal of all formed units would be completed by July 1998, with the exception of one infantry company, the helicopter unit and the signals and medical support units. However, if significant progress is achieved in the implementation process before that time, the military task force could be repatriated earlier.

42. It is widely recognized that the current 90 military observers should be retained at least through September/October 1998 to allow for the completion of residual tasks, such as the monitoring of the discovery of arms caches and the verification of cease-fire violations.

D. Administrative component

43. Since my last report to the Security Council of 12 January 1998 (S/1998/17), the administrative component of the Mission has continued to carry out simultaneously several key tasks, including logistical support to the withdrawal of formed military units and the closure, reconfiguration and upgrading of a number of military and civilian police team sites. These challenging activities, in addition to the regular maintenance of the Mission, have continued to strain considerably the capabilities of the administrative component. Some additional material and human resources are required to proceed with the liquidation process of UNAVEM III, which is still behind schedule owing to the need to address other pressing logistical tasks. In this connection, the recommendations made in paragraph 39 of my report of 12 January remain valid.

X. OBSERVATIONS

44. The failure to comply with the 9 January 1998 timetable for the implementation of the remaining tasks of the Lusaka Protocol and the ensuing tensions between the Government and UNITA on the ground resulted, once again, in an impasse, which was largely due to the persistent delays and last-minute conditions that have become a constant feature of UNITA tactics.

45. However, it is hoped that the major advance achieved on 6 March 1998 with the adoption of an adjusted timetable will reinvigorate the peace process. I commend the efforts made by the Government and UNITA to reach an agreement on

the completion of the outstanding tasks under the Lusaka Protocol by the end of this month, and urge both parties to abide strictly by the new understanding. It is imperative that both the Government and UNITA, in particular, abide fully by the letter and spirit of the Lusaka Protocol and the relevant Security Council resolutions. I do not believe that the international community is ready to accept continuing procrastination in this regard.

46. It is obvious that the completion of the peace process is contingent upon the full and unconditional demilitarization of UNITA, especially those absentees and residual troops mentioned in paragraph 27 above. It is indispensable that UNITA carry it out on time and in full. Unregistered armed elements continue to be reported in some of the provinces, which does not enhance mutual trust or improve the prospects of national reconciliation. Equally, the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation should show restraint and give priority to peaceful actions that contribute to the successful conclusion of the peace process. It is in this spirit that I also appeal for the earliest resumption of the disarmament of the civilian population throughout the country.

47. Needless to say, I strongly deplore the recent attacks by UNITA on United Nations personnel in several areas in Angola. UNITA should unconditionally guarantee the safety and security of all international staff who have been assisting the Angolan people in their pursuit of a lasting peace.

48. The Lusaka peace process has already made significant progress. Many of the remaining tasks could be completed swiftly, including the full normalization of State administration throughout Angola and the final resolution of all issues related to Mr. Savimbi's security detachment. I also continue to believe that a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi might help accelerate the completion of the peace process. Equally, UNITA leadership should move to Luanda, as agreed upon and envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol.

49. In the meantime, the presence of the United Nations in Angola is still needed. As regards MONUA, it would be my intention, subject to security conditions on the ground and to the concurrence of the Security Council, to proceed with its reconfiguration along the lines described in paragraphs 36 to 44 of the present report. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my strong appeal to the international community to continue its assistance to Angola and, in particular, to respond generously to the 1998 consolidated appeal.

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions as at 6 March 1998

	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Grand total
Bangladesh	3	22	3	-	26
Brazil	4	19	-	-	23
Bulgaria	4	19	-	-	23
Congo	3	-	-	-	3
Egypt	3	19	-	-	22
France	3	-	-	-	3
Guinea-Bissau	3	4	-	-	7
Hungary	4	7	-	-	11
India	5	22	15	169	191
Jordan	5	26	-	-	31
Kenya	3	-	3	-	6
Malaysia	4	24	-	-	28
Mali	3	19	1	-	23
Namibia	-	-	-	150	150
New Zealand	3	-	-	-	3
Nigeria	6	32	-	-	38
Norway	3	-	-	-	3
Pakistan	3	-	1[b]	-	4
Poland	4	-	-	-	4
Portugal	4	35	6	180	225
Romania	-	-	4	146	150
Russian Federation	3	-	-	130	133
Senegal	4	-	-	-	4
Slovakia	5	-	-	-	5
Sweden	3	21	-	-	24
Ukraine	3	5	1	-	9

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	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Grand total
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Uruguay	3	25	-	-	28
Zambia	3	24	3	150	180
Zimbabwe	4	22	12		38
Total	98	348	49	905	1 400

[a] Including military police.

[b] A military specialist in the demining school.



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